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THE MEDICAL STANDARD OF CARE IN MISSISSIPPI
INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 1985, just over two years after King v.
Murphy,1 in which the court expanded the previously applied strict
locality rule to a statewide standard, the court again greatly en-
larged the standard. As stated in Hall v. Hilbun,2 the standard
of care to which a physician in Mississippi must now conform
is a national standard, modified only minimally by local factors,
most notably with regard to the availability of medical equipment.
A parallel expansion enlarged the pool from which expert wit-
nesses may be drawn. Where a witness lives or practices has no
per se bearing on his competence. What is required is that the
witness in fact be qualified as an expert and that he be "famil-
iarized"3 with the available resources.
BACKGROUND
Proof of medical malpractice' requires evidence as to the recog-
nized standard of medical care and a showing of the physician's
negligent departure from that standard.' The burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to make this showing,6 which, in most
1. 424 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1982).
2. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985). The court considered this case on direct appeal on November 9, 1983.
Because this opinion was withdrawn and a new opinion substituted, the November 9, 1983, opinion is not
officially reported.
3. See infra text accompanying note 118.
4. "Basically, medical malpractice is the infliction of injury or death under circumstances where it may
be said that the cause thereof is a failure on the part of the defendant medical practitioner to have complied
with applicable standards of medical practice." D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 88 (1973); see also 70
C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 40 (1951).
5. Davis v. Virginian Ry. Co., 361 U.S. 354 (1960). See also Wale v. Barnes, 278 So. 2d 601 (Fla.
1973), conformed to 280 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Vertsteeg v. Mowery, 72 Wash. 2d 754,
755, 435 P.2d 540, 541 (1967) ("In order to sustain a judgment against a physician or surgeon, the standard
of medical practice in the community must be shown, and, further, that the doctor failed to follow the methods
prescribed by that standard." (quoting Richison v. Nunn, 57 Wash. 2d 1, 4, 340 P.2d 793, 795 (1959), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 816 (1960))).
6. Davis v. Virginian Ry. Co., 361 U.S. 354 (1960); Harper v. Baptist Medical Center - Princeton,
341 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1976); Wale v. Barnes, 278 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1973); Delaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss.
190, 164 So. 2d 762 (1964); Versteeg v. Mowery, 72 Wash. 2d 754, 435 P.2d 540 (1967); Hundley v. Martinez,
151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967). In Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187,
349 A.2d 245 (1975), the court held:
The general principles which ordinarily govern in negligence cases also apply to medical malpractice
claims [citations omitted]. Therefore, as in any other case founded upon negligent conduct, the burden
of proof rests upon the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to show a lack of the requisite skill
or care on the part of the defendant.
Id. at 190, 349 A.2d at 247. See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R. 3d 420 (1971).
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cases, 7 must be done through expert testimony.' This requirement
is often a threshold area of proof for the plaintiff.9 An expert
witness will not be judged competent to testify unless he is familiar
with the applicable standard of care, ' ° which varies from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction." Therefore, the criteria used to determine this
standard are often central in negligence actions against
physicians. "
The "strict locality rule," as applied to a general standard of
medical care, limits the obligation of a physician to the level of
learning, skill and experience of physicians practicing in their own
7. Expert testimony is not required if negligence can be determined through the common knowledge of
the lay juror. Graham v. Sisco, 248 Ark. 6, 449 S.W.2d 949 (1970); Dazet v. Bass, 254 So. 2d 183 (Miss.
1971); In Hammond v. Grissom, No. 54,794 (Miss. May 29, 1985), the court stated that the situation exhibited
"an absence of medical care, rather than the misfeasance of some complex medical diagnosis or treatment."
Id., slip op. at 9. (The court noted that the lay observers common-sense observations were strengthened by
their having had some medical training, justifying a rare exception to the rule requiring expert testimony);
Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 548 P.2d 618 (1981). See generally 70 C.J.S. Physi-
cians and Surgeons § 62(d)(2) (1951) ("Expert evidence is not required where the results of the treatment are
of such character as to warrant the inference of want of care from the testimony of laymen or in the light of
the knowledge and experience of the jurors themselves . . ").
8. Ayers v. Barry, 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951); Zills v. Brown, 382 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1980); Sinz v.
Owens. 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949); Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 160 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887 (1975);
Dazet v. Bass, 254 So. 2d 183 (Miss. 1971); Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St. 2d 127, 346 N.E.2d 673 (1976);
Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967). See generally 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Sur-
geons § 62(d)(2) (1951). Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litiga-
tion, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 408,409 (1969) ("[Tlhe technical aspects of his claim will ordinarily be far beyond
the competence of the lay jurors whose duty it is to assess the defendant doctor's conduct.").
9. Plaintiff will be nonsuited if this burden is not met.
Before the plaintiff can recover, she must show by affirmative evidence -first, that defendant was un-
skillful or negligent; and, second, that his want of skill or care caused injury to the plaintiff. If either
element is lacking in her proof, she has presented no case for the consideration of the jury.
Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St. 2d 127, 130, 346 N.E.2d 673, 677 (1976) (quoting Ewing v. Goode, 78 F.
442, 443-44 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897)). See also Merriman v. Toothaker. 9 Wash. App. 810, 515 P.2d 509,
511 (1973) ("Failure to establish a medical standard applicable to defendant's class of physicians is fatal to
a claim of malpractice where the subject matter requires expertise.").
10. Loftus v. Hayden, 391 A.2d 749, 752 (Del. 1978) ("We think that a witness offered to give 'expert
medical testimony' should establish that he 'knows' what degree of skill is ordinarily employed here and that
he is well acquainted or thoroughly conversant with it."). Regarding what constitutes "familiar," the court states
that some cases have required knowledge based on direct occupational or practical experience, and others per-
mit it to be based on observation. id. at 752 n.5. See also Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St. 2d 127, 132, 346
N.E.2d 673, 677 (1976) ("[t~his expert must be qualified to express an opinion concerning the specific standard
of care that prevails in the medical community in which the alleged malpratice [sic] took place . . ").
11. Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949). See also Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975); Annot., 99 A.L.R. 3d 1133 (1980); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 3d 420
(1971); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 43 (1951).
12. Medicine is the only profession to which the courts have applied geographical locality rules as criteria
in determining the standard of care. See Johnson, An Evaluation of the Changes in the Medical Standard of
Care, 23 VAND. L. REv. 729, 730 n.8 (1970). However, regarding attorney malpractice, see Dean v. Conn,
419 So. 2d 148, 150 (Miss. 1982) ("Generally, the same standards of professional conduct are applicable to
the attorney and physician alike, namely: (1) both are required to use that degree of care, skill and diligence
which is commonly possessed and exercised by attorneys/physicians in that locality.").
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communities, or localities.1" The rule was formulated by the courts
in this country ' in the late nineteenth century under the reason-
ing that it would be unfair to hold rural practitioners to the same
standard as their urban counterparts, since they did not have the
same education, training, or facilities."5 Three problems with the
strict locality rule soon became apparent. First, sole practition-
ers in a community were in effect exempt from malpractice lia-
bility. " Second, the rule was often used simply as an exclusionary
rule of evidence; it was frequently impossible for a plaintiff to
find local physicians willing to testify as to the local standard of
care.' Third, it was possible that a group of lax practitioners might
settle in the same community, establishing an inferior local stan-
dard. 8 This was obviously unacceptable: "Negligence cannot be
excused on the ground that others in the same locality practice
the same kind of negligence.""
In response, many jurisdictions expanded the strict locality rule
to a "same or similar locality" rule. " Under this criterion, a physi-
cian is held to the standard of care of his own locality or that of
a similar locality.21 This broadening somewhat reduced plaintiffs
rigors in finding expert witnesses willing to testify.22 But, since
13. See, e.g., Teffet v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1970).
In the smaller towns and country, those who practice medicine and surgery, though often possessing
a thorough theoretical knowledge of the highest elements of the profession, do not enjoy so great op-
portunities of daily observation and practical operations .. .as those who reside in the metropolitan
towns . . . they should not be expected to exercise that high degree of skill and practical knowledge
possessed by those having greater facilities for performing and witnessing operations ....
Id. at 63-64.
14. England has never applied a locality rule to medical malpractice suits. See Waltz, supra note 8, at 410.
15. For discussions of the original reasons for locality rules, see generally Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergen-
cy Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975); Faulkner v. Pezeshki, 44 Ohio App. 2d 186, 337 N.E.2d
158 (1975); King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d
73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967); Shier v. Freedman,
58 Wis. 2d 269. 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973); Johnson, supra note 12, at 730-31; Waltz, supra note 8, at 410-1 I.
16. Waltz, supra note 8, at 411 ("He could be treating bone fractures by the application of wet grape leaves
and yet remain beyond the criticism of more enlightened practitioners from other communities.").
17. See, e.g., Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 531 S.W.2d 945 (1976); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency
Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
18. See, e.g., Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Johnson, supra note 12, at 731.
19. Pederson, 72 Wash. 2d at 78, 431 P.2d at 977.
20. Gambill, 258 Ark. at 770, 531 S.W.2d at 948 ("The standard is not limited to that of a particular locali-
ty. Rather, it is that of persons engaged in a similar practice in similar localities. . . ."). An early case applying
a similar locality rule is Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880), overruled by Brune v.
Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Waltz, supra note 8, at 411.
22. See Johnson, supra note 12, stating that:
Use ot the "same or similar locality" rule reduces to some extent the difficulties presented by the "same
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the standard in the "similar" community might also be low, the
danger of an inferior standard of care persisted. " A new prob-
lem, defining what type of community constituted a "similar
locality," presented itself."4 Similarity seems to have been defined
in geographical and socioeconomic terms.2" But clearly the trend,
in those jurisdictions applying this standard, is to define a similar
community as one with similar medical practices and facilities. 6
The approach today, however, is increasingly toward for-
mulating a standard of care not defined solely in geographical
terms. Legal writers" and cases in a number of jurisdictions" in-
locality" rule. When the plaintiff can look to other localities for expert witnessess he is more likely
to find a physician who is willing to testify as to the standard of care because the expert would not
be testifying against a doctor from his own community. Nevertheless, the plaintiff is still greatly in-
convenienced, initially, by having to determine what constitutes a similar locality, and then because
there is reason to doubt that many doctors would be willing to testify against even a foreign locality
doctor.
Id. at 731-37. But see Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 770-A, 770-B, 531 S.W.2d 945, 950 (1976) (applying
with approval a similar locality rule).
23. See generally Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Johnson, supra note
12, at 732. See also supra note 22.
24. See generally Shilkret, 276 Md. at 195-96, 349 A.2d at 250; HARNEY, supra note 4, at 97.
25. Shilkret, 276 Md. at 195-96, 349 A.2d at 250.
26. Gambill, 258 Ark. at 270, 531 S.W.2d at 948 ("The similarity of communities should depend not on
population or area in a medical malpractice case, but rather upon their similarity from the standpoint of medi-
cal facilities, practices and advantages.") Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Iowa 1976); Waltz, supra
note 8, at 415.
27. HARNEY, supra note 4, § 3.3; Johnson, supra note 12, at 729; Waltz, supra note 8, at 408. See general-
ly Annot., 99 A.L.R. 3d 1133 (1980).
28. In Zills v. Brown, the court held that:
Distinctions in the degree of care and skill to be exercised by physicians in the treatment of patients
based upon geography can no longer be justified in the light of the presently existing state of transpor-
tation, communications, and medical education and training which results in a standardization of care
within the medical profession. There is no tenable policy reason why a physician should not be re-
quired to keep abreast of the advancements in the profession.
382 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala. 1980). See also Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 270, 288 P.2d 1003, 1017
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955) ("The ubiquity of such knowledge, the popularity of ethical standards in every part of
the nation and the uniformity of curricula have combined to create one community of medical practitioners
out of the 48 states and the District of Columbia."); Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Cbnn. 609, 616-17, 356 A.2d
887, 892 (1975) (-[Ilt is no longer true that standards of care and diagnosis will differ substantially from town
to town."); Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 522, 145 S.E.2d 760, 764 (1965) ("Reasons for the more
narrow rule which might have obtained in times past, where transportation was difficult, medical schools and
hospitals often inaccessible, and doctors licensed to practice with little or no formal training, no longer have
any validity."); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) ("[Wie will not perpetrate a rule
designed to protect country doctors in 1902 . . . ."); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md.
187, 194, 349 A.2d 245, 249 (1975) ("Whatever may have justified the strict locality rule fifty or a hundred
years ago, it cannot be reconciled with the realities of medical practice today."); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass.
102, 108, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968) ("The time has come when the medical profession should no longer
be Balkanized by the application of varying geographic standards in malpractice cases."); King v. Williams,
276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967)
("Now there is no lack of opportunity for a physician or surgeon to keep abreast of the advances made in his
profession and to be familiar with the latest methods and practices adopted.") Cited with approval in Douglas
v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968) (en banc); Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206
N.W.2d 166 (1973).
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dicate that the conditions that supported the validity of geographical
locality rules have radically changed;29 today, uniformly required
higher education, widespread medical information, and access to
modem facilities are the bases for more and more courts' recogni-
tion of a minimum national standard of care.3 There are several
approaches toward this abandonment, or severe modification, of
geographical locality rules.
A method still using geographical terminology to expand the
range of the required standard of care is the "same general
neighborhood rule."31 Although some jurisdictions, including
Mississippi,32 appeared to have equated "same general
neighborhood" with the community of the defendant physician (in
effect a strict locality rule), Connecticut has defined
"neighborhood" as including the entire state, thus holding physi-
cians throughout Connecticut to a uniform standard of care.33
Alabama, construing a state statute, has extended the definition
of "neighborhood" to near its outer limit, holding that the "same
general neighborhood" is a "national medical neighborhood or na-
•tional medical community, of reasonably competent physicians
acting in the same or similar circumstances. " "
Another standard, the "medical neighborhood rule," also retains
some vestiges of geographical factors in its formulation. Under
this rule, the boundaries of the area establishing the standard of
care are extended to include "medical and professional means
available in those centers that are readily accessible to appropriate
treatment of the patient." 6 The physician cannot use only the
facilities and means available locally if transfer to an accessible
29. In fact, a 1916 Minnesota case, Viita v. Dolen, held that:
Frequent meetings of medical societies, articles in the medical journals, books by acknowledged
authorities, and extensive experience in hospital work, put the country doctor on more equal terms
with his city brother. He would probably resent an imputation that he possessed less skill than the
average physician or surgeon in the large cities ....
132 Minn. 128, 137, 155 N.W. 1077, 1081 (1916).
30. See cases cited supra note 28.
31. See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R. 3d 420, 430-32 (1971).
32. Copeland v. Robertson, 236 Miss. 95, 112 So. 2d 236 (1959). But see Zills v. Brown, 382 So. 2d
528, 530 (Ala. 1980) (stating that there is a "significant distinction between the 'strict locality rule' and the
'same general neighborhood' rule, inasmuch as the latter is a liberalization of the former." However, the dissent-
ing opinion defined "same general neighborhood" as the defendant's "community." Id. at 535).
33. Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887 (1975).
34. ALA. CODE § 6-5-484(a) (1975).
35. Zills, 382 So. 2d at 532.
36. Pederson, 76 Wash. 2d at 79, 431 P.2d at 978.
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center is indicated due to a deficiency in local training or facilities. 7
The standard expands or contracts according to the circumstances
of each case.38 The rule is considered to have "paved the way for
the national standard." 9
A minimum national standard of care is required in some
jurisdictions for "basic medical problems."40 These cases hold that
the minimum acceptable standards for such common treatments
and procedures as bone-setting41 and X-rays "2 are basic, would
not vary from locality to locality, and justify the application of
a uniform national standard.
Several jurisdictions also hold specialists" to a national stan-
dard of care. A specialist, in representing himself as possessing
special skill and knowledge, is held to a higher standard than a
general practitioner." A national survey45 indicated: "On the basis
37. See Sinz v. Owens holding that:
[Tlhe duty of a doctor is not fulfilled merely by utilizing the means at hand in the particular village
where he is practicing .... [T~he borders of the locality and community have, in effect, been extended
so as to include those centers readily accessible where appropriate treatment may be had which the
local physician, because of limited facilities or training, is unable to give.
33 Cal. 2d 749, 755, 205 P.2d 3, 6 (1949) (quoting Tevdt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183,
188 (1940)). See also Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 550 P.2d 1158 (1976). But see Gambill v. Stroud,
258 Ark. 766, 770-C, 531 S.W.2d 945, 950 (1976), arguing that a small town doctor should not be penalized
when transfer to a medical center "is not practicable."
38. Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 576, 550 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1976) ("The very value of the Peder-
son rule lies in its amenability to contraction or expansion in each case depending on the proofs adduced. We
therefore decline any invitation to define the area in geographical terms, be they broad or narrow.").
39. Shilkret, 276 Md. at 196, 349 A.2d at 250.
40. See generally Johnson, supra note 12, at 737-38.
41. Murphy v. Little, 122 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965).
42. McElroy v. Frost, 268 P.2d 273, 279-80 (Okla. 1954) ("It is a matter of common understanding that
a proper method of treating human ailments by x-ray would not vary from place to place or state to state.
What is the best practice in one place would be the best in another.").
43. "The question of when a physician becomes a specialist has been held to be not one of law, but of fact,
primarily for his own determination." 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 41 (1951).
44. See Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978) (cardiovascular surgeon)
(In construing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2794 (West 1974) to mean that specialists are not to be judged by
a standard tied to locality, the court held that "[tihe various medical specialties have established uniform re-
quirements for certification. The national boards dictate the length of residency training, subjects to be covered,
and the examinations given to the candidates for certification. Thus the medical profession itself recognizes
national standards for specialists that are not determined by geography." Id. at 1337); Naccarato v. Grob, 384
Mich. 248, 253-54, 180 N.W.2d 788, 791 (1970) (pediatricians) held that:
[clalling a specialist parochial or bucolic is hardly appropriate. The reliance of the public upon the
skills of a specialist and the wealth and sources of his knowledge are not limited to the geographic
area in which he practices .... Therefore, geographical conditions or circumstances control neither
the standard of a specialist's care nor the competence of an expert's testimony.
See also 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 41 (1951).
45. Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884 (1962). See also Johnson, supra
note 12, at 738-39; Note, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 435 (1971). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965)
applies a national standard to specialists and a same or similar standard to general practitioners. "Unless he
represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice
of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of
that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities." Id.
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of the existence of standardized requirements for certification,
subscriptions to medical specialty journals, medical specialty
societies, and statements from American Specialty Boards, it is
concluded that the practice of medicine by certified specialists
within most medical specialties is similar throughout the coun-
try. '' "b In applying a national standard to specialists, the ltw is
seen to reflect medical realities, "[s]ince the medical profession
itself recognizes national standards for specialists that are not deter-
mined by geography . .."
Other jurisdictions have held that a national standard of care
exists for, and is applicable to, general practitioners as well as
specialists .8 However, evidence showing justifiable circumstances
for not adhering to the national standard is admissible and may
include "elements of locality, availability of facilities, specializa-
tion of general practice, proximity of specialists and special
facilities as well as other relevant considerations. 49 This "assures
that the local practitioner need not run the risk of being judged
by a national standard that may be abstractly unaffected by local
conditions."5 But locality is not the determinative factor in
establishing the standard of care. Instead, local limitations are a
factor - and only a factor - that may be considered in deter-
mining, in each circumstance, whether adherence to a national
standard of care is to be required. 1
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Prior to the holding in King v. Murphy,5" a line of Mississippi
46. Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884, 887-89 (1962).
47. Shilkret, 276 Md. at 198, 349 A.2d at 251.
48. May v. Moore. 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982); Fain v. Moore, 155 Ga. App. 209, 270 S.E.2d 375 (1980);
Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187,
200, 349 A.2d 249, 252 (1975) ("[Tlhere is no valid basis for distinguishing between general practitioners
and specialists in applying standards of care."); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793,
798 (1968) ("The proper standard is whether the physician, if a general practitioner, has exercised the degree
of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into account the advances in the profession.");
King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 79, 431
P.2d 973, 978 (1967) (calling for physicians to exercise the "care and skill which is expected of the average
practitioner in the class to which he belongs . . . ."). The Maryland court in Shilkret eschews the term "average"
used in the Brune and Pederson standards and substitutes "reasonably competent," aligning itself with the Ken-
tucky court in Blair. See also Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973).
49. Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970).
50. Drs. Lane, Bryant, Eubanks & Dulaney v. Otts, 412 So. 2d 254, 258 (Ala. 1982).
51. Cases applying this standard include Drs. Lane, Bryant, Eubanks & Dulaney v. Otts, 412 So. 2d 254
(Ala. 1982); Mull v. Emory University, Inc., 114 Ga. 63, 150 S.E.2d 276 (1966); Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d
901 (Iowa 1976); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n,
276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); Pharmaseal
Laboratories v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589 (1981); King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478. 279 S.E.2d 618
(1981); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
52. 424 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1982).
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Supreme Court cases established what was in effect a strict locality
rule in Mississippi. In Copeland v. Robertson5 3 the court quoted
the rule from American Jurisprudence and expressed its accord
with it:
It is the universal rule that a physician is liable to his patient for a failure to exercise req-
uisite skill and care. By that it is meant that a physician must possess that reasonable degree
of learning, skill and experience which ordinarily is possessed by others of his profession,
and that he must exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the exertion of
his skill and the application of his knowledge, and exert his best judgment as to the treat-
ment of the case intrusted to him - in short a physician is bound to bestow such reasonable
and ordinary care, skill, and diligence as physicians and surgeons in good standing in
the same neighborhood, in the same general line ofpractice, ordinarily have and exercise
in like cases. The terms "physician" and "surgeon" here are used interchangeably, the courts
making apparently no attempt, so far as this point is concerned, to distinguish their respective
liabilities; and the practitioner is equally responsible in either case, whether the injury
results from want of skill or want of care.'
The same standard was again quoted, with apparent approval, in
other Mississippi cases. However, in none of them was the ex-
clusion of a non-local witness in issue.5"
It was not until Dazet v. Bass5 6 that excluded testimony became
an issue. The trial court had peremptorily instructed the jury to
find for the defendants, specialists in obstetrics and gynecology
in the Jackson area. All physicians who testified stated that the
defendants "possessed and exercised the standard of care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by gynecologists in the Jackson area. " s
The court held that, absent medical testimony of malpractice, all
that was shown was that an undesired result occurred and that
physicians are not warrantors against bad results. s8 However, the
trial court refused to admit the testimony of a New Orleans physi-
cian because he was unfamiliar with the standard of medical skill
exercised in the Jackson area. The court stated:
53. 236 Miss. 95, 112 So. 2d 236 (1959).
54. Copeland, 236 Miss. at 110, 112 So. 2d at 241 (quoting 41 AM. JUR. Physicians and Surgeons § 82
(1938)) (experts testified as to the local standard of care regarding gynecological treatment in Jackson, the
locality of the defendant physician).
55. Delaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190, 164 So. 2d 762 (1964) (the court rejected arguments that plain-
tiff had failed to establish a standard of skill and care to be exercised); Hill v. Stewart, 209 So. 2d 809 (Miss.
1968) (expert testified as to the general standards of skill of general medical practitioners on the Gulf Coast,
the locality of defendant physician); Hawkins v. Osborn, 383 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (tried in United
States District Court due to diversity of citizenship, applied the same standard expressed in Copeland; plain-
tiffs expert testimony that defendant physician had not exercised reasonable care and skill raised an issue of
fact which was rebutted by other medical witnesses). See also Sanders v. Smith, 200 Miss. 551, 27 So. 2d
889 (1946).
56. 254 So. 2d 183 (Miss. 1971).
57. Id. at 186-87.
58. Id. at 187. See also Sanders v. Smith, 200 Miss. 551, 27 So. 2d 889 (1946).
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Plaintiff contends with a great deal of force that the so-called "locality rule" is no longer
valid for the reason that physicians now attend the same colleges, receive the same post
graduate courses in their specialities, and go to the same seminars; that the standards of
care for a specialist should be and are the same throughout the country, and that geographical
conditions or circumstances are no longer valid as controlling the standards of a specialist's
care or competence. Conceding that there is considerable force in the argument on this
question, we are not convinced that the "locality rule" should be entirely abolished. .. "
But because the expert had been dismissed from the stand without
testimony, the court could not determine if the exclusion was preju-
dicial, and the court was unable to address the issue.
King v. Murphy
In King v. Murphy,"( the court modified and enlarged its previous
locality (or neighborhood) rule so that physicians and surgeons
in Mississippi were held to a statewide standard of care.6 From
the wording of the holding, the standard applied both to specialists
and general practitioners.
We are of the opinion that the locality rule in Mississippi should not be abolished, but
it should be extended and expanded. Therefore, we hold that the standard of care by which
the acts or omissions of physicians, surgeons, or specialists are to be judged shall be that
degree of care, skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably careful, skillful, diligent and
prudent practitioner in such field of practice or specialty in this state, and for a reasonable
distance adjacent to state boundaries. An expert witness who is knowledgeable of, and
familiar with, the statewide standard of care shall not have his testimony excluded on the
ground that he does not practice in the state."
The trial court in King had permitted the plaintiffs expert witness
to testify by expanding the previously applied strict locality rule
to a similar locality rule, "although expressing some doubt as to
whether or not Dr. Gardner qualified."' The witness, Dr. Richard
Gardner, had practiced at a major military hospital, in Boston,
Massachusetts, and in Ft. Myers, Florida, population approxi-
mately 162,000 to 180,000.64 luka, where Murphy was treated,
had a population of 2,846; Tishomingo County's population was
18,434.5 Since Dr. Gardner had never practiced in Mississippi
the supreme court held that he did not qualify under the previous
59. Dazet, 254 So. 2d at 187.
60. 424 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1982).
61. A judicially created statewide standard of care is not unique to Mississippi. A "same general neighbor-
hood" standard was defined as including the entire state of Connecticut in Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 160 Conn.
609, 356 A.2d 887 (1975). The Delaware court, interpreting a statute, appears to apply a statewide standard
in Loftus v. Hayden, 391 A.2d 749 (Del. 1978).
62. King, 424 So. 2d at 550.
63. See id. at 551.
64. See id. at 550.
65. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF HOUSING at 26-18 and
26-113 (1982).
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locality rule, the trial court's similar locality rule, or the new
statewide rule.6 Therefore, his testimony had been erroneously
admitted, and the case was reversed and remanded.67
The court traced the previous application of the locality rule
in Mississippi and noted that in Dazet v. Bass"' the court had con-
ceded "considerable force" 9 in plaintiffs arguments for extending
the rule. The court also considered decisions and statutes of other
states. Although no out-of-state cases were cited in the majority
opinion, Virginia ' and Arizona 1 statutes were considered. Justice
Hawkins, joined by Justice Bowling, on petition for rehearing con-
curred in part and dissented in part."2 Concurring because the long
application of locality rules in Mississippi indicated a need for
prospective application of a new approach, the dissent argued for
the abolition of locality rules in medical malpractice actions in
Mississippi. While small town practitioners should not be unfairly
penalized, the dissent contended that limiting witness competency
under locality rules is the "wrong medicine""3 to ensure their
equitable treatment. The dissent further argued that limiting
witness competence on the basis of locality is inconsistent with
what several decisions" indicate is the court's liberality regarding
competency in nonmedical cases.
Moreover, according to the dissent, the approach was subject
to serious flaws. The dissent supported this argument with a
66. King, 424 So. 2d at 550.
67. Id. at 551.
68. 254 So. 2d 183 (Miss. 1971).
69. Id. at 187.
70. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.20 (1979) ("IT]he standard of care by which the acts or omissions are to be judged
shall be that degree of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the field of practice
or specialty in this Commonwealth . . . ."). The testimony of an expert witness familiar with that standard
will be admissible. A same locality standard or similar locality standard, if circumstances indicate this to be
more appropriate, may be applied instead of the statewide standard. The statute has been referred to in several
recent cases. However, none of them applied the statewide standard because the causes of action arose before
the statute's adoption. In these cases the standard of care which the plaintiff was required to establish was the
previous locality or similar locality standard, applicable both to specialists and general practitioners. See Fitz-
gerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1982); Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 259 S.E.2d 741 (1979); Ives
v. Redford, 219 Va. 838, 252 S.E.2d 315 (1979); Maxwell v. McCaffrey, 219 Va. 909, 252 S.E.2d 342 (1979).
71. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-563 (1976). The Arizona statute also holds medical practitioners to a
statewide standard, which applies both to general practitioners and specialists. Prior to enactment of the stat-
ute, Arizona applied a same or similiar standard to general practitioners and a national standard to specialists.
Kronke v. Daniel, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156 (1972). Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 (1978)
applied the previous national standard to specialists because the action was pending at the time of the statute's
enactment. However, the court stated: "Arizona's new medical malpractice legislation would hold the specialist
to a statewide standard of care." Id. at 346 n.2 1. Thus, the statute actually narrows the standard to be applied
to a specialist in Arizona. Musa v. Adrian, 130 Ariz. 326, 636 P.2d 104 (198 I) applied the statute to a specialist.
72. King, 424 So. 2d at 551 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 551 n.l.
74. Capitol Transport Co. v. Segrest, 254 Miss. 168, 181 So. 2d 111 (1965); Glenn Falls Insurance Co.
v. Linwood Elevator, 241 Miss. 400, 130 So. 2d 262 (1961); King v. King, 161 Miss. 51, 134 So. 827 (1931).
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lengthy quotation from Pederson v. Dumouchel.75 The quote
reviewed the original rationale for locality rules and argued that
today, with post-graduate training and global village communica-
tions, there is ample opportunity for physicians, irrespective of
locality, to keep abreast of medical advancements,76 creating what
is increasingly a national standard of medical care. Therefore,
[t]he "locality rule" has no present-day vitality except that it may be considered as one
of the elements to determine the degree of care and skill which is to be expected .... No
longer is it proper to limit the definition of the standard of care which a medical doctor
or dentist must meet solely to the practice or custom of a particular locality, a similar
locality, or a geographic area."
Physicians, the dissent argued, should be held to the degree of
competence of the average practitioner in their class. But this has
no relation to a rule excluding an expert's testimony "unless he
first determines how medicine is practiced in the same or 'similar'
localities where the lawsuit arose . ,,8 The dissent further
stated:
In lawsuits our search should be for accuracy and truth. It seems incongruous to me that
a medical specialist from the Mayo Clinic, the Ochsner Clinic, the Menninger Founda-
tion, or the Sloan-Kettering Institute could not express opinions within his field of knowledge
on what constitutes good medical practice in any court in the United States, or this entire
planet, for that matter.
It is my belief, and certainly my hope, that inevitably all courts will reach this view
of the matter. In my opinion, our present rule will result in considerable confusion."
The first post-King decision to apply the King standard was
Pharr v. Anderson.8 o The witness was qualified as an expert in
family medicine. Although he had trained outside Mississippi, he
had practiced in Jackson for thirty years. The court held that his
testimony was competent under the King standard that "an expert
witness whose knowledge of, and familiarity with, the statewide
standard of care shall not have his testimony excluded." 8
On November 9, 1983, the original Hall v. Hilbun" decision
was handed down. The court applied the pre-King strict locality
rule, apparently because the case arose in the trial court before
75. 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
76. But see Gambill, 258 Ark. at 769, 531 S.W.2d at 948 ("However desirable the attainment of this ideal
may be, it remains an ideal.").
77. King, 424 So. 2d at 552-53 (Hawkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Pederson,
72 Wash. 2d at 79, 431 P.2d at 978).
78. King, 424 So. 2d at 552 (Hawkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id.
80. 436 So. 2d 1357 (Miss. 1983).
81. Id. at 1359 (quoting King v. Murphy, 424 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1982)).
.2. See supra note 2.
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the King decision. No mention was made of King or the statewide
standard of care.
In Reikes v. Martin,83 the court again applied the pre-King strict
locality rule, since the case was tried prior to King." Appealing
the lower court verdict for plaintiffs, appellant physicians assigned,
among other errors, the admission of expert testimony of a British
physician who moved to America in 1977 and had three times
failed the American licensing test. The court reversed, holding
that the physician was not qualified to testify, since the applicable
standard of care was the strict locality rule, and "[c]learly Dr.
Brown was not knowledgeable of or familiar with the practice
of medicine in Hattiesburg in 1975. "8 But on May 22, 1985, after
Hall v. Hilbun on remand, the original opinion was withdrawn
and replaced.8 Applying Hall, the court stated that the expert's
testimony "cannot be excluded simply because he was not familiar
with the practice of medicine in Hattiesburg."87
In Holmes v. Elliott,8" the plaintiffs witness was licensed in
Oklahoma and Georgia and currently practiced in Oklahoma. He
trained in Georgia, and practiced at Bethesda Naval Hospital in
Guam, and in Georgia. The court noted that his "testimony did
not show that he was familiar with or knowledgeable of any stan-
dards of medical practice at Lumberton or south Mississippi, or
of any particular locality within the state of Mississippi or any
adjacent state."89 Thus, he was not qualified to give his opinion
regarding compliance with "any local or statewide standards of
care in Mississippi."9 The court likened the situation to that in
King in which "the expert has had no contact with Mississippi,
outside of participation in a malpractice trial."91 Although a witness
need not practice in Mississippi, "the expert must nevertheless
have some knowledge of, or familiarity with, the statewide
standard." 2
83. No. 53,915 (Miss. Jan. 25, 1984) (original opinion). See infra notes 84-86.
84. In dealing with Reikes' prospective application of King, the Hall court stated:
It is true that Reikes v. Martin [citation omitted] states that King v. Murphy shall be applied prospec-
tively only. Reikes is pending before this Court on petition for rehearing. Consistent with the implica-
tions of Pharr, the holding of Holmes, and what we have said above, the statement in Reikes is seen
as incorrect.
Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d at 877 n.13.
85. Reikes, No. 53,915, slip op. at 14.
86. Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985).
87. Id.. at 393.
88. 443 So. 2d 825 (Miss. 1983).
89. Id. at 829.
90. Id,
91. Id. at 830.
92. Id.
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The court rejected the argument that a uniform operative proce-
dure for a hysterectomy establishes a national standard of care.
Even if it did,
[t]he test of King v. Murphy has not been met. Reiterating, King held that an expert who
is knowledgeable of, or familiar with, the statewide standard of care shall be allowed to
testify as an expert. Thus, even if a national standard exists, it still must be shown the
applicable standard is the same. In order to do this, the expert must have knowledge of
the statewide or local or similar locality standard. In the instant case, expert Dr. Daniel
was not shown to have the requisite knowledge of, or familiarity with, the statewide or
Lumberton area or similar locality standard of care . . .
Hall v. Hilbun:9" ORIGINAL OPINION
On May 20, 1978, at the Singing River Hospital in Jackson
County, Mississippi, Dr. Glyn R. Hilbun performed an explora-
tory laparotomy on Mrs. Terry Hall to relieve an obstruction of
the small bowel. Following surgery, Mrs. Hall was moved to a
recovery room, where Dr. Hilbun remained in attendance with
her. With Mrs. Hall alert and communicating and all vital signs
stable, she was moved to a private room.
According to the record, Dr. Hilbun made no post-operative
contacts with the patient or inquiries concerning her progress after
she was moved from the recovery room to a private room. The
nursing staff did not communicate with Dr. Hilbun, who was on
call that weekend, about Mrs. Hall's condition. Dr. Hilbun's next
contact with the patient was after the patient's husband, Glenn
Hall, alarmed at his wife's difficulty in breathing, called Dr.
Hilbun. He came immediately, but by the time he had arrived
Mrs. Hall had died from cardio-respiratory failure.
On May 19, 1980, Glenn Hall brought a wrongful death action
based on the post-operative care provided by Dr. Hilbun. Sug-
gested liability was predicated on Dr. Hilbun's failure to make
follow-up inquiry and alleged failure to give the nursing staff ap-
propriate post-operative instructions.
At trial, plaintiff called a Cleveland, Ohio physician to establish
the existence of a national standard of surgical care to which Dr.
Hilbun was obligated to adhere. The expert stated that he did not
know the standard of care practiced by Pascagoula surgeons, but
that "he did know what the standard should have been.""5 The trial
93. Id.
94. See supra note 2.
95. Hall v. Hilbun. 466 So. 2d 856. 864 (Miss. 1985).
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court ruled that the expert was not qualified to testify regarding
whether Dr. Hilbun had departed from the standard of care.
Another expert, also from Cleveland, was called. He too was un-
familiar with the Pascagoula standard of care and also was not
permitted to testify.
The defendant's expert from Cleveland had moved to Pascagoula
one month before the trial and had practiced at the Singing River
Hospital. He testified that there was a great difference between
Cleveland and Pascagoula in the medical standard, notably regard-
ing personnel and equipment. With his experts excluded, the plain-
tiff failed to establish a prima facie case, and defendant's motion
for a directed verdict was granted.
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed relying on Dazet v.
Bass which it stated was the latest expression of this court on the
local standard of care. There was no mention of the statewide
standard of care that had been established by King.
Justice Hawkins, joined by Justice Robertson, specially con-
curred, noting:
In this case, neither the majority nor dissenting opinion cite King . . . . I believe King
is squarely applicable to this case, and under our holding in King the circuit judge was
clearly correct in ruling the testimony of the eminent physicians incompetent. I still have
my hope the majority may some day agree any so-called "locality" or "similar locality"
rule on the competency of renowned physicians is anachronistic, unrealistic, and tanta-
mount to a due process violation in preventing parties from having a fair trial. To keep
this kind of evidence from a jury's determination is, to me, blatantly unjust."
Hall v. Hilbun: CONTROLLING OPINION
A. Introduction
On February 27, 1985, the Mississippi Supreme Court grant-
ed the plaintiffs petition for rehearing. The November 9, 1983,
formal opinion was withdrawn and the trial court decision reversed
and remanded for a new trial.97
By way of introduction, the court discussed the two prongs of
the "locality rule" as traditionally applied in medical malpractice
actions. The first prong was a rule of substantive law: that the
physician must perform according to the standard of care in his
locality. The second aspect was a rule of evidence: that an expert
could not testify unless he had practiced in the locality in ques-
tion and was familiar with the local standard of care.
96. Id., slip op. at 13 (Hawkins, J., specially concurring).
97. The court stated that the standard announced in the case should be applied retroactively upon retrial.
Hall, 466 So. 2d at 875-77.
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Reviewing King v. Murphy, the court stated that King had
enlarged both concepts. The substantive rule regarding standard
of care was expanded from a single locality to include "at least
the entire state of Mississippi plus 'a reasonable distance adja-
cent to state boundaries.'"8 Regarding the evidentiary rule, the
court stated that King removed geographical limits. Under King,
"an expert witness who is knowledgeable of, and familiar with,
the statewide standard of care shall not have his testimony ex-
cluded on the ground that he does not practice in this state. "9
The court interpreted this language to mean that
[ulnder King an otherwise competent medical expert, say, from New York, would be eligible
to testify if he had, prior to taking the witness stand, substantially familiarized himself
with the standard of care in the (greatly enlarged) "locality or neighborhood.""
The court stated that King established a satisfactory framework
for analysis in its distinction between the substantive rule regard-
ing standard of care and the evidentiary rule concerning expert
witnesses.
B. Substantive Law: The Standard of Care
In Hall v. Hilbun the court established in Mississippi a
competence-based national standard of care. The court deemed
this inevitable because of the increasing nationalization of medical
training, the mobility of physicians, and the opportunity for con-
tinuing medical research. In addition, "[riegarding the basic matter
of the learning, skill and competence a physician may bring to
bear in the treatment of a given patient, state lines are largely
irrelevant.""1 1 The court stated the physician's duty is
to possess or have reasonable access to such medical knowledge as is commonly possessed
or reasonably available to minimally competent physicians in the same specialty or gener-
al field of practice throughout the United States . . . . [The physician is also required] to
have a practical working knowledge of the facilities, equipment, resources (including per-
sonnel in health related fields and their general level of knowledge and competence), and
options (including what specialized services or facilities may be available in larger com-
munities, e.g., Memphis, Birmingham, Jackson, New Orleans, etc.) reasonably available
to him or her as well as the practical limitations on same. In the care and treatment of
each patient, each physician has a non-delegable duty to render professional services con-
sistent with that objectively ascertained minimally acceptable level of competence he may
be expected to apply given the qualifications and level of expertise he holds himself out
as possessing . . .
98. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 867 (quoting King v. Murphy, 424 So. 2d 547, 550 (Miss. 1982)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 870.
102. Id. at 871.
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Three components are implicit in this standard: the physician's
knowledge and skill; his exercise of medical judgment in the course
of treating the patient; and his employment of medical resources.
The court differentiated the effect of locality among these com-
ponents. 03
Locality is not a factor in determining the standard of care with
regard to the physician's knowledge and skill. "Each physician
may with reason and fairness be expected to possess or have
reasonable access to such medical knowledge as is commonly
possessed or reasonably available to minimally competent physi-
cians in the same specialty or general field of practice throughout
the United States . . ,,104 The court stressed that "objectively
reasonable expectations regarding the physician's knowledge, skill,
capacity for sound medical judgment and general competence are,
consistent with his field of practice and the facts and circumstances
in which the patient may be found, the same everywhere. "'
With regard to the second component, the exercise of medical
judgment, the effect of the locality is minimal. Local custom might
be evidence of compliance with the duty of care, but it is not con-
clusive of it. "The content of the duty of care may be informed
by local medical custom but never subsumed by it."'"° But with
regard to the physician's knowledge and skill, locality is not a
factor.
However, with regard to the last component, the facilities and
resources available to the physician, "there remains a core of validi-
ty to the premises of the old locality rule.""7 Noting that resources
may vary from community to community, the court established
a "resources-based component"1" to the national standard of care:
[G]iven the circumstances of each patient, each physician has a duty to use his or her
knowledge and therewith treat through maximum medical recovery, each patient, with
such reasonable diligence, skill, competence, and prudence as are practiced by minimally
competent physicians in the same specialty or general field of practice throughout the United
States, who have available to them the same general facilities, services, equipment and
options. "
103. The defendant's expert testified about the differences in medical practice between Cleveland, Ohio, and
the Singing River Hospital. The court noted that these differences related solely to the resources available to
the physician and had no bearing on "the regimen of post-operative care a minimally competent surgeon should
have prescribed for a patient .... Hall, 466 So. 2d at 878.
104. Id. at 871.
105. Id. at 872.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. id. at 873.
109. Id.
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Thus, a physician cannot be faulted for not employing facilities
that were not reasonably available. ' The court stated that this
recognition was a practical addition to King: "[T]he physician's
duty of care must take into consideration the quality and kind of
facilities, services, equipment and other resources available."'
An additional consideration would exist in cases where a
resource was not locally available but was reasonably accessible
in a neighboring medical center. The question here would be
whether the duty of care was met by the physician's actions in
deciding whether or not to transfer the patient, taking into ac-
count the medical risk as well as economic considerations.
The court noted that the Hall standard of care was not a depar-
ture from King but merely a logical extrapolation from it. The
King standard was determined by the level of medical competence
throughout Mississippi "'and for a reasonable distance adjacent
to state boundaries."'1" 2 Since this adjacency would necessarily
include Mobile, Memphis, and New Orleans, and since, includ-
ing Jackson, the standard in these cities was equal to that availa-
ble anywhere in the United States, "it may be seen that for all
practical purposes King has embraced what many call the 'national
standard of care.'"113
C. Evidentiary Rule: Expert Testimony
Under the Hall standard, where an expert lives or practices has
no per se bearing on his qualification as a witness. The court
quoted King: "An expert witness.., shall not have his testimony
excluded on the ground that he does not practice in this state."
114
The court noted two misinterpretations of this language:
that those who do not reside in Mississippi and adjacent to it are
excluded; and that the expert must possess intimate knowledge
of the practice in the particular medical facility. Neither of these
is a correct interpretation. The residence of the physician is ir-
relevant, and the expert must be familiar with the minimum legal
standard of the state, not the practice in the facility or communi-
110. Id. at 878. This would appear to apply to physical equipment rather than to support personnel. In its
discussion of the facts of the instant case, the court noted that the only possible basis for defendant's contention
that relevant differences existed between Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Cleveland, Ohio, where the expert resided,
was in the area of nursing personnel. But "[bly establishing the inadequacy of the nursing and personnel resources
available to him in Pascagoula, Mississippi, Dr. Hilbun only increases his own responsibility. Where a physi-
cian is working with medical personnel of known modest competence, his duty of instruction and control is
increased." Id. at 879.
111. Id. at 873.
112. Id. (quoting King v. Murphy, 424 So. 2d 547, 550 (Miss. 1982)).
113. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 873.
114. Id. (quoting King, 424 So. 2d at 550).
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ty. Medical experts are to be treated in the same manner as ex-
perts in other fields: "There is no valid basis in judicial reason
for not treating 'the question of the competency of the testimony
of physicians the same as any other expert."' 5
The court delineated two subject areas of testimony and what
was necessary to qualify an expert to testify regarding them. First,
to testify about the conclusions and diagnoses that a minimally
competent physician would draw or the actions he should take,
the physician may base his testimony on "information reasonably
available to the physician, i.e., symptoms, history, test results,
results of the doctor's own physical examination, X-rays, vital
signs, etc. .... ""' Second, to testify about the duty of care that
the defendant physician owed and whether his acts were in com-
pliance with that duty, the expert must be
familiarized with the facilities, resources, services and options available. This may be done
in any number of ways. The witness may prior to trial have visited the facilities, etc. He
may have sat in thc courtroom and listened as other witnesses described the facilities. He
may have known and over the years interacted with physicians in the area. There are no
doubt many other ways in which this could be done, but, significantly, we should allow
the witness to be made familiar with the facilities (and customs) of the medical communi-
ty in question via a properly predicated and phrased hypothetical question."'
Thus, instead of requiring that the expert be familiar with the local
facility, it is sufficient that he merely be familiarized with it." 8
115. Id. at 874 (quoting Holmes v. Elliott, 443 So. 2d 825, 833 (Miss. 1983)) (Hawkins, J., specially con-
curring).
116. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 874.
117. Id. at 875.
118. Applying Hall, the court in Trapp v. Cayson, 471 So. 2d 375 (Miss. 1985) reh'g denied, July 10, 1985,
rejected the appellant's contention that plaintiffs expert who was held to be qualified by the trial court should
have been excluded under King v. Murphy. The expert was board-certified in diagnostic radiology and was
a professor of radiology at Louisiana State University in New Orleans. The court held that the expert was
qualified regardless of the fact that he had never been to Tupelo or the hospital in question, until the trial.
[Hle stated that from his experience and training, knowledge of standards of practice of radiologists
in general, and from reading the deposition of Dr. Trapp [the defendant] and examining the medical
records in the case, he is familiar with, and knows, what the case and practice should be, and is, in
Tupelo, Mississippi.
Id. at 380. The court stated that under Hall, "the law of Mississippi in malpractice cases, as now stated, is
based upon a national standard of care." Id.
The same day Hall was also applied in Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985) reh'g denied, July
10, 1985. The trial court, relying on King, had excluded the testimony of a specialist in emergency medicine
from Birmingham, Alabama. Reversing, the court held that the lower court erred and applied the Hall criteria
to the expert's testimony regarding various aspects of the treatment of the patient. As to patient history, since
what history should be obtained is within the realm of general medical knowledge, a qualified expert may qualify
"without more . . . ." Id. at 367. Similarly, the physical examination is "a matter with respect to which physi-
cians are expected to be competent without regard to the availability of facilities or equipment." Id. Regarding
diagnostic testing, the court noted that, under Hall, liability does not attach for failure to perform tests if the
necessary equipment is not reasonably available, but here such equipment was almost certainly accessible; and
as to the diagnosis, noting that the basis of the suit was failure to diagnose a perforated ulcer, the court stated
that to the extent the testimony was excluded because the expert practiced in Birmingham or was supposedly
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The court discussed "hired guns," experts who testify for a price.
The court rejected the use of a locality rule to exclude these ex-
perts: "The instrument with which they would have us afford this
protection is too blunt."1 9 The court noted that the trial judge must
determine whether the potential witness is in fact an expert and
that "[1]iberal cross-examination regarding 'bias, interest and previ-
ous experience as an expert in medical malpractice cases should
be allowed both on voir dire and when the witness' testimony is
being presented to the jury." ' 0
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
It is clear that the Mississippi Supreme Court reached an in-
evitable result in Hall v. Hilbun on petition. With widespread stan-
dardization of medical training, geographically determined
standards of care have little basis.1" Thus, a physician's skill and
treatment are expected to meet minimum national standards.
The present ruling eliminates the confusion inherent in King's
description of the standard of care as being "that degree of care,
skill and diligence practiced.., in this state, and for a reasonable
distance adjacent to state boundaries." '22 Unclear aspects included
whether a small-town physician would be held to the standard of
care of a regional medical center such as Jackson on the basis
of his presence within the political boundaries of the state; what
constituted a reasonable adjacency to state borders; and the ef-
fect, if any, of a facility's lack of medical resources.
Hall also reduces the potential for confusion as to what the
geographical limits of witness competency might be. Under King,
it was unclear whether a "reasonable distance adjacent to state
boundaries" 2' indicated that a New Orleans physician might testify
regarding conditions in Biloxi or in luka. Did it mean that a Mont-
not familiar with the standard of care in Jackson, in Hinds County or in the hospital in question, the lower
court erred.
In Hammond v. Grissom, 470 So. 2d 1049 (Miss. 1985), an expert who had walked through a hospital emergen-
cy room, but had not studied the procedures employed by that hospital, was held to be qualified as an expert.
The expert met the qualifications of Hall v. Hilbun. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985) and Hardy v. Brantley, 471
So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985), based on his professional qualifications and experience and his knowledge of the
standard of care for emergency room doctors in Jackson, Mississippi, and in other cities throughout the United
States.
119. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 875.
120. Id.
121. See cases cited supra note 28.
122. King, 424 So. 2d at 550.
123. Id.
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gomery, Alabama physician was competent to testify regarding
conditions in Meridian or Vicksburg?
In King, a physician from Ft. Myers, Florida, was adjudged
incompetent to testify because he had neither practiced in Missis-
sippi, nor examined or treated a patient there. Holmes v. Elliott,17
applying King, excluded an Oklahoma expert because "his
testimony did not show that he was familiar with or knowledgeable
of any standards of medical practice at Lumberton or south
Mississippi, or of any particular locality within the state of
Mississippi or any adjacent state."" 5
Under King and Holmes, the possibility existed that plaintiff
would face inordinate difficulty in procuring medical testimony.
Extensive judicial as well as scholarly notice has been taken of
the unwillingness of physicians to testify against one another in
malpractice trials " 6 Since expert testimony is required in all but
self-evident malpractice cases,1 '7 the inability to procure expert
testimony poses the problem that the plaintiff might be deprived
of a remedy for an actual injury. Cases abandoning geographically-
based standards of care have noted this problem." 8 The Hall stan-
dard of witness competency, of course, clears the way for "pro-
fessional experts" and "hired guns" from throughout the nation.
But witness competency does not assure witness credibility, and
nothing in Hall precludes impeachment of the expert by the
defendant. 2 9
Thus, while it is clear that Hall reached a correct result, less
obvious is the validity of its insistence that it does nothing more
124. 443 So. 2d 825 (Miss. 1983).
125. Id. at 829.
126. Graham v. Sisco, 248 Ark. 6, 449 S.W.2d 949 (1970) holds that:
It is a matter of common knowledge, often mentioned in judicial opinions and other authorities that
the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case is often unable to find a medical expert willing to testify
against a fellow physician .... It goes without saying that the plaintiffs inability to obtain favorable
expert testimony poses the possibility of great miscarriages of justice.
Id. at 10, 449 S.W.2d at 951. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317
P.2d 170, 175 (1957); Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970); Sampson v. Veenboer,
-252 Mich. 660, 234 N.W. 170 (1931); Carbone v. Warburton, I I N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Faulkner
v. Pezeshki, 44 Ohio App. 2d 186, 337 N.E.2d 158 (1975); King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d
618 (1981); Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d 829 (1968); Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.
Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967); D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, t MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 14.0115] ("There
is doubtless a natural hesitancy to criticize another physician with whom there must be frequent or even daily
contacts on a hospital staff, in a medical society, or in relationship to mutual patients."); Belli, An Ancient
Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, I VILL. L. REV. 250 (1956). Cf Note, Medical Malprac-
tice -Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 834, 837 (1966) (discussion of the reasons for the reluctance of
physicians to testify and possible alternatives to expert testimony).
127. See supra note 7.
128. King v. Williams, 279 S.E.2d 618 (S.C. 1981); Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 438 P.2d
829 (1968).
129. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 879.
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than "smooth some of King's rough edges."'" Rather than a "refine-
ment""' of King, Hall appears to be a complete reformulation
of the standard of care and medical expert competency in
Mississippi.
In defining the standard of care the Hall court stated that be-
cause the King standard included not only Mississippi but a
reasonable area adjacent, including Memphis, Mobile, and New
Orleans, and because with the addition of Jackson the level of
medical care is equal to that available anywhere in the United
States, then "for all practical purposes King has embraced what
many call the 'national standard of care.'"" While this syllogism
may indicate that such a result may be reached, the plain language
of the King standard, "in this state and for a reasonable distance
adjacent to state boundaries,""' coupled with the holding in King
itself excluding a Ft. Myers, Florida physician, indicates a more
obvious reading of King: that it established not a national but a
statewide standard, somehow modified by the standards of an
undefined adjacent area. Had King's goal been to establish a na-
tional standard, the reasonable conclusion is that it would not have
done so in such an obscure manner. Instead of attempting, by in-
ference, to reason that Hall is nothing more than an explicit state-
ment of what was implicit in King, it would seem that the
credibility of the decision would have been better served by a forth-
right repudiation of King. 1"
A similar problem exists in the Hall court's interpretation of
King regarding expert witness competence. King stated: "An ex-
pert witness who is knowledgeable of, and familiar with, the state-
wide standard of care shall not have his testimony excluded on
the ground that he does not practice in this State. " 135 Hall inter-
preted this to mean that geographical restrictions on the pool of
available expert witnesses had been removed by King:
Under King an otherwise competent medical expert, say, from New York, would be eligi-
ble to testify if he had, prior to taking the witness stand, substantially familiarized himself
with the standard of care in the (greatly enlarged) "locality or neighborhood.""
130. Id. at 877.
131. Id. at 876.
132. Id. at 873.
133. King, 424 So. 2d at 550.
134. The closest Hall comes to a repudiation of King is in a footnote:
To the extent they may announce or proceed on the assumption of the existence of rules of law in
conflict with those set forth here, King v. Murphy, Holmes v. Elliott [citations omitted] and all of our
other prior medical malpractice cases shall from and after this day stand modified or overruled as may
be appropriate.
Hall, 466 So. 2d at 873 n.7.
135. King, 424 So. 2d at 550.
136. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 867.
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While nothing in King per se precludes this reading, this inter-
polation appears strained, if not Delphic. Again, the better ap-
proach would have been to establish the new rule without
attempting to support it on the slender reed of King.
Irrespective of its treatment of King, Hall v. Hilbun establishes
a standard that comports both with present-day medical realities
and with the need for fairness, predictability, and clarity in medical
malpractice suits. This standard affords the defendant the protec-
tion of showing the limitations of available physical resources.
But the skill and knowledge required of him are not geographically
limited. Since locality is not a determinative factor of witness
competency, this approach prevents the standard of medical care
from becoming nothing more than an exclusionary rule of
evidence.
Edward Cohen
